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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F.\LCON.AERO ENTERPRISE, .) 
lNC.. a Utah Corporation, and 
CHARLES VV. TAGGART, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents~ f 
i 
vs. 
.TOliN F. BO,VERS, et al, 
Defendants~,· 
IX'Tl2ll~IOUNTAIN DE.VELOP-
~IEN1. INC., a Corporation, ~! 
Defendant-Appellant. / 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
No. 
10173 
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTER-
PRISE, INC., LACKED LEGAL CAPACITY 
TO FILE SUIT, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN NOT DIS:l\'IISSING THE ACTION. 
'Vhether Falconaero's corporate existence con-
tinued after dissolution is determined by Section I 01, 
3 
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Chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1961. Under this Section, 
inasmuch as Respondent Falconaero distributed the 
property to its sole stockholder, not during dissolution, 
but prior thereto~ the corporation died upon the execu-
tion of the Certificate of Dissolution. 
Respondent relies solely upon Section 100, Chapter 
28, Laws of Utah 1961 to save it. But that section 
applies only to corporations which have claims, rights 
or liabilities incurred. The claim upon which Respondent 
predicates its continued existence is a supposed cause 
of action to quiet title. Why Respondent cited Boothe 
v. Wyatt, 54 U. 550, 183 P. 323, is a complete mystery. 
Neither the fact situation nor the law of the case is in 
point. Respondent cites Hacienda Homes v. Peck, 113 
P 2d 487, and Piland v. Craig, 154 P. 2d 583, to support 
the position that where one has conveyed by warranty 
deed, he still retains a claim upon which a quiet title 
action may be predicated. These two cases are not in 
point. In each one, the Plaintiff fee title holder had 
placed a warranty deed in escrow, to be delivered upon 
the completion of a contract by a purchaser. But the 
deed in each case had not yet been delivered. Thus, the 
Plaintiff grantor had not actually parted with title. 
To support its position that a grantor by warranty 
deed still had a claim upon which an action to quiet 
title n1ay be brought, Respondent cites 97 A.L.R. 711. 
This annotation divides the cases on this point into three 
classes: One class upholds the position of Appellant 
that no quiet title action Inay be brought by a warrantor 
4 
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aflcr coun.~yance, and .. Appellant's citations in the 
original brief support this view. A second class of cases 
holds that a warrantor may file an action after parting 
with title if the grantee retains part of the purchase 
price pending dearing of title. But this requirement 
docs not exist in the case at bar. The third class permits 
a warrantor to sue to quiet title, having a sufficient 
i11lcrest, because of his liability under the warranty. 
These are poorly reasoned cases. But even this reason 
l'or per1nitting suit by the warrantor does not exist here. 
In the case at bar, Respondent Falconaero, the dis-
solYed corporation, had warranted to its sole stockholder 
as a distribution to him of its assets. The stockholder 
is entitled only to that which the dissolved corporation 
had. Thus, any warranty is ineffectual. The stockholder 
certainly has no need of, nor is he legally entitled to 
sueh protection. Suppose he sued for breach of war-
nmty. l-Ie "-ould have to disgorge some of his distribu-
tion back to the corporation to pay his own judgment. 
Thus, under neither Section 100 or Section 101, 
Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1961, is the corporate exist-
ence of Respondent Falconaero prolonged. Logic and 
the law point to no other result. The trial court should 
haYe held there was no capacity to sue and should have 
dismissed the cause, and disposed of this case. 
On page 3 of its brief. Respondent attempts to 
mnke an issue of i-\ppellant's admission of Respondent's 
corporate existence, and later denial of it by amendment 
to the ~lnswer. E-ddently} Respondent is attempting to 
) 
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cover its embarrassment for the discovery of its nlis-
representation in its complaint as to the corporate 
existence and the ownership of the property at the time 
suit was filed. The amendment was proper, if for no 
other reason than that the pleadings might conforn1 to 
the evidence as established at the trial. 
POINT 2. 
PLAINTIFF FALCON AERO ENTER-
PRISE, INC., WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COM-
PLAINT. 
Appellant has nothing to add to the argu1nent in 
the original brief on this Point. Respondent-Falconaero 
having distributed the property to its sole stockholder 
prior to the filing of the within action, was not and is 
not the real party in interest as required by Rule 17 
( 2) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMIT-
TING TAGGART TO BE .JOINED AS A 
P .A.RTY PLAINTIFF. 
In attempting to support its claim that Taggart 
was properly joined, Respondent cites the following 
cases: 
6 
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.J uhnson , .. Continental Casualty Co., 78 U. 18, 
aoo Pae. lO:J:!. 'I'his case held that a bill of exceptions 
was not filed in the time allowed. Nothing in the opinion 
1·elatcd to pertnitting a party to be joined where the 
I ,laintitl' "·as not the real party in interest. \'Vhy this 
case was cited is a mystery. 
Shay Y. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 47 L~. 252, 
I.>a Pae. :n, pern1itted amendment to add a new 
allegation. Evans v. IIoutz, 57 U. 216, 193 Pac. 858, 
permitted an amendn1ent as to tender. The opinions in 
these eases say nothing as to substitution of a party 
plaintiff who was not the real party in interset, and for 
that reason are not in point. 
Plotkin Y. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 125 SE 
J41, held it was discretionary with the trial court whether 
one who has conveyed propertywhile an action was pend-
ing n1ny continue to prosecute his suit or whether the 
name of the grantee should be substituted. Again, this 
case is not in point. 
X ot one of the above cited cases upholds the posi-
tion of Respondent-that there may be substitution of 
a plaintiff in the stead of one who is not the real party 
in interest at the commencement of the suit. 
1 t is 1nost interesting to observe that Respondent's 
l'ibtion of 135 .A .. L.R. 325 (which supposedly supports 
the proposition that amendment may be made to sub-
stitute the real party in interest as a plaintiff) at page 
331 holds directly contrary to its position in stating: 
7 
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"It has been held that where an action is brought in the 
name of a plaintiff who is dead or nonexistent, the com-
plaint may not be amended by substituting a plaintiff 
having capacity to sue." Numerous cases are cited by 
A.L.R. to support this proposition, some of which cases 
are cited in Appellant's original brief. 
Respondent cites Kehrlein-Swinerton Construction 
Co. v. Rapkin, 156 Pac. 972, and Norton v. Steinfeld, 
288 Pac. 3, to support its position that an action by a 
non-existent Plaintiff could be amended to insert the 
name of a proper party. In these two cases, corporate 
charters were suspended due to non-payment of fees 
to the state, there being provisions for reinstatement of 
corporate charters upon payment of fees and penal-
ties. The court permitted the substitution of the officers 
and directors as trustees. However, there is a vast differ-
ence between the suspension of corporate powers as in 
these two cases, and the termination of corporate ex-
istence by voluntary dissolution as in the case at bar. 
Thus, the two cited cases are not in point. 
The other cases cited by Respondent are poorly 
reasoned and appear to set forth a minority view of 
the subject. They discuss whether or not amendment 
is abuse of discretion, while the real point is whether 
there is anything before the court to be amended, when 
the plaintiff is non-existent. 
Appellant relies upon the authorities cited in the 
oriO'inal brief. and the conclusions therein stated: That 
0 ' 
Respondent-Falconaero was non-existent at the time 
8 
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till' wilhill action was filed; therefore, the action was 
a nullily and there was nothing before the court to 
ameiHL The law and the facts here cannot be seriously 
disputed. 
POINT 4. 
TIIE COnlPL.A.INT DID NOT STATE il 
l'L~\11\1 AS .AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPEL-
Ll~NT UPON \VHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
PREDICATED, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISl\llSSED. 
Uespondents are laboring under the i1npression 
that Appellant did not raise this issue below, and there-
fore cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal, 
citing the cases of Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, and 
Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Co., 74 U. 24, 276 
Pac. 659. 
There are two things wrong with this position. The 
tirst is that Appellant DID raise the sufficiency of the 
Complaint. The quotation from Appellant's First De-
fense. on Page 15 of the original brief filed herein, raises 
the sufficiency of the Complaint. 
The other thing wrong is that the cited cases relate 
to an1biguities in the respective cOinplaints, which the 
courts held could not be raised for the first time on 
appeal. But here, we do not have an ambiguity in the 
Complaint. The Complaint does not state a cause of 
:
1
.ction .. A.s t~ ,~he law on this point, please see 5 .A .. rn. 
9 
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J ur. 2d, Appeal and Error, paragraphs 592 and 593, 
pages 59 to 61. This annotation cites the Utah case 
of Mayer v. Rankin, 91 U. 193,63 P 2d 611, 110 A.L.U. 
837. The Utah case holds that the absence of an alle-
gation vital to the cause of action is not a mere technical 
omission, but is a fatal defect which can be raised on 
appeal for the first time. The defect in the case at bar 
is vital to the cause of action, and may be raised at anr 
time. 
Thus, on both these matters, the Respondents are 
1n error. 
As to the defect, a complete reading of paragraph 
3 of the Complaint as quoted in Respondents' brief at 
pages 10 and 11, shows clearly that while it is alleged 
" ... ; that the defendants ... claim or may claim some 
interest in and to said property ADVERSE to that 
of the plaintiff," it is further alleged in the sa1ne para-
graph" ... , but that said claimed interest of said de-
fendant is invalid and IS INFERIOR to the rightj 
title and interest of the plaintiff in and to said property 
... " In other words, the admission in the latter part 
of the allegation, that the right IS INFERIOR, in 
effect repudiates the allegation that it is ADVERS1~. 
Thus, by admitting Defendant's interest was in-
feriOl\ and praying that it be so declared, the Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to a decree quieting title to the property. 
10 
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POINT 5. 
l>El•'l~~D.A~T-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE 
iS \'OT DEFE£\.TED BY THE FOUR--YEAil 
.\U\'EHSE POSSESSION .. AND LIMITATION' 
:~T.ATUTES HELA.TING TO TAX TITLES. 
Hcspondents and their counsel are haYing diffi-
l'ulty in understanding that in the case of the four-year 
statute relatiug to tax titles, as in all other cases either 
in law or in equity, the plaintiff has the burden and 
must establish a prima facie case by his evidence. 
Scdion 104-2-5.11, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 
l~}J1, in defining the term "tax title", sets forth the 
required proof to establish a prima facie case. This 
indudes proof that a tax was levied against the prop-
erty, there was a tax sale for non-payment of taxes, 
and, the rede1nption period having expired, that a final 
sale was 1nade to the county. Then must follow evidence 
that the property was relieved of the tax lien. These 
are the requirements of the definition of a tax title as 
cited aboYe. Counsel for Appellant affirms that such 
(lefinition is the law~ in spite of protests from counsel 
for Hespondents on page 13 of the answer brief. It was 
enacted by the Legislature, signed by the Governor 
and duly published. 'Vhy counsel for Respondents ques-
tions the assertion that "this is the law" is difficult to 
understand, especially when he is relying on other pro-
,-isions of the smne enactment. 
There is wisdmn in these requirements. After sucb 
eYidence has been introduced, the fee title claimant 1s 
11 
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on the horns of a dile1nma: First, if he cannot show 
irregularities to defeat the tax title, he loses his case. 
Second, if he does show such irregularities, he then is 
confronted with the effect of the four-year statute. 
Appellant's position is that Respondents did not prove 
a prima facie case to come within the purview of the 
four-year statute. 
The only evidence consisted of the auditor's tax 
deed (Pre-Trial Exhibit 4) dated February 28, 1939, 
issued by authority of Section 80-10-66, Utah Revised 
Statutes 1933, and the deed from Salt Lake County to 
Mr. Hancock (P. Exhibit 3) dated December 31, 1943, 
executed pursuant to Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 68 
( 8) , Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
·vvhile it is true that Section 80-10-66, Utah Re-
vised Statutes 1933 provided that an auditor's tax deed, 
executed under its provisions, was "prima facie evidence 
of the facts recited therein", it was repealed by Chapter 
101, Laws of Utah 1939, which provided new proce-
dures, a new form of tax deed, and new provisions as 
to what shall be prima facie evidence. As to the effect 
of such a repeal, the court in Bejger v. Zawadzki, 252 
Mich. 14, 232 NW 746, at page 747 says: "A remedy 
or rule of evidence, created by the Legislature in dero-
gation of the comn1on law, creates no vested right to 
that remedy, and can be taken away by repeal." Suther-
land, Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, 'T ol. 1, 
Section 2032, states under the heading of Repeal of 
Statutes prescribing remedies: "'Likewise, where a 
12 
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partit·ular t'onn of procedure by express or in1plied 
proYision is nutde tnandatory in the enforcement of an 
existing right, it operates to abrogate previous ren1edie:) 
whether those re1nedies are prescribed by another statute 
PI' exist by conunon law." Thus, the repeal of Section 
H0-10-()6, Utah Revised Statutes .1933, destroyed the 
prinw facie effect of the auditor's tax deed. Consequent-
ly. the auditor's tax deed in this case is not now prima 
facie evidence of anything. 
Respondents state that the deed from Salt Lake 
County to ~Ir. I-Iancock is prima facie evidence of all 
the prior proceeding leading up to the execution of 
sai<l deed, by virtue of Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 
hH, Utah Code Annotated 1943. This is a gross mis-
statetnent of the law. Section 68 is divided into eight 
subparagraphs. Subparagraph ( 5) pr~vides that an 
auditor's tax deed conveying property sold to a pur-
l'haser at the public sale at the conclusion of the statu.:. 
tory redemption period is prima facie evidence of certain 
matters. But the deed from the County to Mr. Han-
cock is no such deed. Subparagraph (7) provides that, 
as to property not bid in at the said public sale, the 
auditor's endorsement made on the tax sale record, 
eonveying the fee simple title to the county, duly cer-
tified. is prima facie evidence of certain matters. Eut 
nga1n. the deed to Mr. Hancock does not come within 
these provisions. The deed to Mr. Hancock was executed 
under subparagraph ( 8) . This counsel defies Respond-
cnts and their counsel to point out any provision in this 
:ntuparnrJraph providing that any statement in such a 
13 
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deed is pri11ta facie evidence of any matter recited there-
in. 
Appellant agrees with Respondents' cited Utah 
cases which hold that a valid tax title does not have to 
be established under the four-year statute. But no Utah 
case has laid down the rule that a tax title claimant, rely-
ing upon the statute, is relieved from the responsibility 
of proving a prima facie case. 
Thus, Respondents, having not established a prima 
facie case as defined by Section 104-2-5.11, Chapter lU, 
Laws of Utah, 1951, cannot claim protection under the 
four-year statute. 
POINT 6. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S FEE TITLE 
IS NOT DEFEATED BY THE SEVEN-YEriR 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND LIMITATIOX 
STATUTES. 
In rebutting the arguments of Respondents' brief, 
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to keep three 
things in mind: First, that the claimed acts of adYersc 
possession must be confined to the period of 1955 to 
1961, inclusive, for that is the only period of time Juring 
which the taxes were paid prior to delinquency. Please 
see Bowen v. Olson, 2 U.2d 12, 268 P 2d 983, 985, 
which holds that redemption after prelitninary sale does 
not constitute the payment of taxes necessary to estab-
lish adverse possession. Second, that under the rule 
14 
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of Kurz v. llltune, 407 Ill. 383, 95 NE 2d 338, adverse 
possession Hcannot be 1nade out by inference or in1pli-
ration. but 1nust be established by evidence that is dear, 
positive and unequivocal, all presumptions being in 
t'a n ll' of the true owner." 
Third, the use of the stables and the operation of 
the chuck wagon restaurant on Redwood Road, three-
quarters of a n1ile east of subject property, and the 
maintenance of the lake some distance to the south of 
it. did not constitute acts of trespass as against the 
subject property or the owner thereof. There being no 
trespass, no cause of action arose, and no adverse pos-
session or limitation statute commenced to run, ·whieh 
could ripen into title. Thus, these acts cannot be con-
sidered in the case at bar. 
Respondents, in their brief, rely upon three 1nain 
proYisions of Section 78-12-9, U.C.A. 1953, as follows: 
I. Land cultivated or improved. 
This was Yaluable com1nercial and industrial prop-
erty, which Respondent intended to use for commercial 
purposes, and which sold for $2,000.00 per acre. In 
the words of ~lr. Firmage, the son, it was actually used 
as follows (Tr. page 16): "It was used for grazing pur-
poses. It was used for about three years as a catch basin 
for diYerting water from the lake that we were develop-
ing. and it was used for drainage ditches. It was also-
we did some leveling. ~Ir. Hancock tilled it before ·we 
bought it from him." 
·15 
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First, no definite time was established for any of 
said acts, except grazing, which appeared to have been 
continuous. Appellant submits there was no clear, posi-
tive or unequivocal evidence the other acts occurred 
during the period 1955 to 1961, when taxes were paid. 
Thus, these acts cannot be considered. In addition, as 
stated in Day v. Steele, 111 U. 481, 184 P 2d 216, 
an act of leveling is insufficient to establish adYerse 
possession, even though coupled with other acts of 
casual use. Also, under Day v. Steele, and 3 Am. J ur. 
2d, pages 93 and 94, the adverse acts must be commen-
surate with the nature, character, and locality of the 
property, and to some purpose to which it is adapted. 
These acts of using the property as a catch basin and 
for drainage ditches not only failed to be appropriate 
use of the property to ripen into title, but actually 
were detrimental to subject property, and not inlprove-
ments, whether the subject property be considered as 
commercial and industrial in nature, or merely agri-
cultural. 
Also, Mr. Firmage, the son, admitted in his testi-
mony (Tr. page 42) as follows:" ... and no, we didn't 
till it. 1.\'Ir. Hancock tilled it and we pastured it." So, 
neither did Respondents cultivate the land. 'Vith it 
having been neither cultivated nor ilnproved, the clahne(l 
adverse usage of the property could not ripen into title. 
2. Protection by a substantial inclosure. 
As to the claimed fencing, a careful reading of 
Mr. Firmage's testimony (Tr. page 43, lines 22 to 2G) 
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iudi<:aks there were some places where net wire fencing 
ocl'lltTc<l. some places where '"they" (apparently refer-
ring to smneone else) had barb wire fencing, and smne 
places where there was neither. But that around the 
entire area Respondent Falconaero put up the electri-
fic.·d wire. According to this testimony, it appears the 
horses got cut up in the other fencing, and the electric 
wire kept them out of it. 
~Ir. Fir1nage was asked by his own counsel the 
purpose of the fencing (Tr. page 56). His answer was, 
''Just to keep the livestock in." This admission affinn-
nti,·cly establishes that Respondent never did intend 
the electric wire to protect the property, and certainl~r 
it failed to constitute a substantial inclosure . 
.. A.u inspection of the pictures ( P. Exhibits 7 to 
:.?1) confirms the inadequacy of the claimed fencing. 
P. Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 18, show only 
an irregularly spaced line of posts, but absolutely no 
wire of any kind, either electric, barb or net. The other 
pictures show fragments of what appear to be barb 
wire, running into the ground either in one or in both 
directions. 
By no stretch of the imagination can one conclude 
that the oral testimony and pictures establish that Re-
spondent Falconaero protected the claimed property 
by a substantial inclosure. The electrified wire was 
solely to keep the stock from straying and from getting 
cut up in the barb wire. These ad1nissions, coupled with 
the I'evelations of the photos, establish by affir1natiYe 
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evidence the very opposite of Respondents' clai1n. There 
was absolutely no substantial inclosure which protected 
the property. 
But this is not all. The subject property consisteJ or 
several blocks in a platted subdivision known as Asbury 
Park. The question naturally arises as to the legal effect 
of inclosing an area which includes platted streets. Can 
such an inclosure (flimsy in this particular case) ripen 
into an adverse title by cutting off the owner's access~ 
This same question came up in regard to the use of a 
public stream in the case of North Point Consolidated 
Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 U. 
246, 52 Pac. 168. This case held that where there was 
a public right involved as well as a private one, adverse 
usage by a claimant could not ripen into a lawful right 
against the public, nor as against a private user. Here, 
the platted streets are public property. Applying this 
Utah case here, Respondent Falconaero, regardless of 
the kind of fencing used, cannot get an adverse claim 
either as against the public, nor as against a private 
owner, the Appellant in this case. 
3. Pasturage. 
This valuable industrial and commercial property 
was surrounded by such uses. It sold for a high price. 
The income frmn pasturage ranged from $150.00 to 
$400.00 per year, not just for the subject property of 
20 acres, but for the entire 1000 acre tract ( 15 cents 
to 40 cents an acre). As stated in Day v. Steele and i3 
An1. J ur. 2d, supra, the nature, character, and locality 
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of the property govern the use that an adverse clainl-
unt must nutke of it to perfect his title. The evidence 
shows conclusively that subject property was not so 
used by Respondents. 
I-lowever, there is still another reason why pastur-
ing this property could not ripen Respondents' clain1 
into title. On pages 40 and 42 of the Transcript, .Nir. 
Firmage adtnitted that it was tillable property, and 
that :\lr. IIancock had so used it before they became his 
successors. But they did not till it. This Court, in Adams 
'"- Latnicq, ---· U. ____ 221 P 2d 1037, at page 1040, 
said: ''The rule that title to property may be acquired 
by adverse possession if it is grazed by an adverse claim-
ant during the eqtire grazing season of each year is 
limited to lands which because of their character are 
reasonably suited for grazing purposes only and has 
not been extended by the courts to land which can be 
rultintted during the non-grazing months of the year." 
Thus. even if we ignore the commercial and industrial 
propensities of the subject property, under the rule 
of this Court, the grazing of this property, which was 
at least cultivatable by Respondents' own evidence, 
could not cause Respondents' claim to ripen into title 
under our statute. 
It is uncontrovertible that Respondents have not 
established their adverse claim by "clear, positive and 
unequivocal evidence," or at all, under any one of three 
bases relied upon in the their brief. 
To rebut Respondents' claim on page 17 of its 
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brief that Appellant is barred by the seven-year limi-
tation statutes, we respectfully refer this Court to See-
tion 78~12-7, U.C.A. 1953. This section provides that 
the holder of the legal title is presumed to have been 
possessed of the property within the time required b~· 
law, and that the occupation of the property by an~· 
other person is deemed have been in subordination to 
the legal title, unless adverse possession has been estab-
lished. Respondents have failed to establish adverse 
possession. Appellant submits that it is entitled to the 
above presumption. 
POINT 7. 
A DEED FROM AN HEIR CONVEYS 
TITLE. 
In a footnote to Respondents' Statement of Facts 
(page 2 of the Answer brief), Respondents make a 
misstatement of the law which needs correcting. The 
statement is as follows: "Obviously, such a deed from 
only one of the alleged heirs, without a probate pro-
ceeding or a determination of heirship proceedings to 
show true heirship does not convey fee title." 
Please see Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 U. 420, 2!3 
P 2d 355, wherein this Court said at page 357: " ... 
Appellants urge that the cmnplaint did not state a cause 
of action and that plaintiffs have not the capacity to 
sue because there has been no adjudication of heirship; 
that plaintiffs are not all the heirs of the decedent; ... 
'V e find no 1nerit in this contention. Upon the death 
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uf lhe decedent, the title to any property of which she 
died possessed inunediately passed to and vested in her 
heirs, subject to administration and the payment of 
debts. The purpose of an adjudication of heirship is 
not to vest title but to adjudicate where the title of the 
decedent has already vested. Regardless of whether 
there had been an adjudication of heirship, the rights 
of heirs can be asserted or defended in any proper man-
ner." (Italics ours) . 
CONCLUSION 
If the decision of the lower court is permitted to 
stand in this matter, we sincerely believe that some 
well-established and fundamental principles of law re-
lating to parties in interest and their substitution, to tax 
titles, and to our statutes relating to adverse possession, 
will be overturned or seriously clouded, which would 
result in future uncertainty and consequential litiga-
tion. \Ve therefore respectfully submit that the lower 
court's decision should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'VILLIAM D. CALLISTER, 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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